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We are no longer the common law courts that perhaps we once
were. We are statutory courts. The overwhelming share of our business
is the interpretation of what Congress, and the state legislatures, say the
law is. I would hope that we engage in some reasoned dialogue with
them, and maybe agree on some things, but they are the primary branch
of government. A problem arises, then, when Congress does not speak as
plainly as we would like them to speak.
Why doesn't Congress speak more plainly? Is it because congress-
men all have marbles in their mouths? Is it because they are a bunch of
dummies? That's not it. At a recent count, forty-four percent of the
members of Congress were lawyers. I assure you that most of the actors,
the prime movers in the first branch of government, know exactly what
the process is about. They understand the use of language; they under-
stand its uses and its limitations. No, the real problem is that we start
out with 435 prima donnas in the House and 100 prima donnas in the
Senate, and the name of the game is to get them to agree on a single set of
words. We are not talking about trying to get Congress to agree on
something unimportant or noncontroversial, like whether to declare
Grandmother's Day. Instead, we are talking about the hard issues, like
the environment, economic decisions and civil rights.
Those 535 people that we described are going to find it difficult to
agree on an agenda, let alone on the words to describe whatever consen-
sus they reach. The consensus that is reached to get a bill passed in the
first place is a tenuous and confused one. Is it any wonder that the words
they do finally choose tend to have diffuse and ambiguous meanings?
My favorite story along these lines involves Representative Morris
Udall's passage of the strip-mining law, Act of August 3, 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified at scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 30
U.S.C. (1982)). This was a typical piece of legislation. He had passed it
through the House one time but could not move it in the Senate. The
next time he passed a bill through both the House and the Senate, and
President Ford vetoed it. He finally got a Democratic president who
committed himself to signing a bill if Representative Udall could get it
* United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit.
JUDGE MIK VA: REPLY
through Congress. Because strip mining is one of the more confronta-
tional issues that the nation faces, there were directly opposing views to
reconcile in fashioning a bill. The miners and mine owners, the "states'
righters," and the environmentalists each have very strong views on what
the strip-mining laws should be.
Representative Udall fashioned a compromise and got it out of the
committee and onto the floor. At one point, in his effort to shepherd the
compromise through the House of Representatives, Udall, as floor man-
ager, was explaining why it was a great bill and why it ought to be
passed. One of the congressmen from West Virginia, a strip-mining
state, arose and asked if the gentleman from Arizona would assure him
that this bill would carefully protect states' rights and state sovereignty
and that the states would continue to perform their role in managing
strip mining within their borders. Representative Udall solemnly as-
sured the gentleman that he was absolutely correct, that the bill very
carefully preserved the role of the states in the process-state sovereignty
was not impinged upon in any form. Twenty minutes later a pro-en-
vironmentalist congressman arose and asked if the gentleman from Ari-
zona would assure him that the bill, once and for all, set single standards
for strip mining and ensured that one federal law would cover strip min-
ing throughout the country. Representative Udall assured the gentleman
that he was absolutely correct, that this bill, once and for all, set uniform
federal standards. Some of us were sitting in the cloakroom during this
exchange; when Representative Udall came out for a drink of water one
of the congressmen who had been listening in told him that both posi-
tions could not be right. Udall then assured that gentleman that he was
absolutely correct.
It is not surprising that when the statute came before the courts
there were some ambiguities. It simply was not as clear as it might have
been in describing when the state was supposed to act and when the fed-
eral government was supposed to act. And yet, what should Congress-
man Udall have done-spend another twenty years trying to find more
precise words to set forth his ideas concerning proper strip-mining law,
even though he might never get 218 of his colleagues to agree with him
again? It is this exigency that makes the necessity of reviewing legislative
history an absolute given.
I am convinced that there simply is no way we can go back to those
good old days when courts spent ninety-five percent of their time care-
fully moving the law forward in the common law process. It makes no
sense to compare ourselves to the English courts, which function in an
altogether different reviewing capacity than we do. England does not
have a written constitution; therefore the kinds of inquiries that can
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come before their courts are much more limited than the ones that come
before our courts. English courts interpret the law on its face while we
have the duty to also determine the validity of the law itself by measuring
it against the Constitution.
We are stuck with the proposition that Congress is going to pass
laws that require interpretation, deal with more and more complicated
subjects and involve more and more technical expertise. Therefore, the
words are going to be more and more difficult to comprehend. Most
state constitutions still have "antimultifariousness" provisions that say
the legislature cannot cover more than one subject in a bill. If the legisla-
ture has two subjects in a bill, the whole bill is unconstitutional. There is
no such proscription on the federal legislature. The Congress is just as
apt to pass a whole new criminal law as a rider to a continuing resolution
as it is to consider subjects in some kind of diverse fashion.
It is true, of course, that if Congress has not done its job, the courts
should not do it for them. Courts should not legislate; it is not our role.
Many times the ambiguity in a statute is in a genuine zone of unresolved
policy; the courts ought to recognize those situations and leave them
alone. On the other hand, it is often the case that Congress is saying,
"We're using this fuzzy langnage in the statute, but this is what we really
mean." In those cases, we as judges have to look at the committee re-
ports and at other clues. And we do have to look. We cannot just tell
Congress that they could have said it more plainly, and that until they
do, we are not going to enforce it. We can't say, "We pass."
Consider the strip-mining legislation, and let me exaggerate it just
slightly. One provision of the bill provides that the state shall do X and
one provision of the bill provides that the federal government shall do X.
What should a judge do when the two contenders come to court on this
issue? Should the judge say, "I've got to go fishing"? Or should the
judge say, "On the one hand they say this and on the other hand they say
that. Now I've got to go fishing"? I think that the role of an Article III
court must be to find a resolution to such ambiguities.
With respect to the Udall dispute, I would have gone back to the
committee report, as I think most of the judges who were involved in the
various disputes did. I would have resolved most of the disputes in favor
of federal supremacy-on the ground that most of the fight over this
statute was about whether there was going to be a set of federal standards
superimposed on the states. That is, in fact, the way most of the cases
were resolved.
As long as Congress continues to pass complicated, multifarious
bills in devious ways, and sweeps difficult disagreements under the rug,
the courts are going to have to interpret those statutes as best they can. I
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think, therefore, that courts would be well advised to try to find some
common vocabulary and some common rules, and to give up the hope-
less task of saying that we are no longer going to look outside the words
of the statute. We cannot insist on calling a statute as Congress writes it.
There are very few statutes which on their face clearly express what Con-
gress intended.
An interesting and related question is how a court's interpretive role
compares with an administrative agency's interpretive role with respect
to a statute which the agency is charged with carrying out, and in which
Congress has not been clear. In its pure terms, I have no problem with
the concept articulated in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). If the law is clear, the courts
ought to interpret it, even if the agency has come out the other way. If
there are any ambiguities, however, courts ought to defer to the agency-
the group of experts to whom Congress has given the first bite. But
although judges agree with this theory, there is grave confusion about the
application of the theory to real cases-and the real cases come up when
Congress is silent about something.
In these cases, should the agency be able to read anything it wants
into the statute? I cannot believe that this is what the Court meant in
Chevron. I am sure that no one on the Supreme Court now, or at any
time in our history, would say that the agency should be allowed to write
its own mandate. The members of administrative agencies are not
elected. They are not accountable to anyone, other than possibly the
Appropriations Committee the next time the agency's budget is consid-
ered. If the statute is silent about something, then the agency's power
should be limited, just as the courts' power ought to be limited. For
example, in Chevron it seemed to me to be very clear that because the
statute hadn't said anything about a "bubble concept," it was improper
for the agency to fashion that power for itself. Of course, it is in these
areas that the courts have the most trouble because, most of the time, the
agency is going through the same woods that courts have to go through.
The law simply is not as clear as it ought to be. In these situations,
courts should recognize that Congress entrusted agencies with expert re-
sponsibility. Unless the agency itself has tried to write the statute, agen-
cies ought to be given every deference and treated as experts. If the
agency has tried to write the statute, the courts' expertise ought to take
over. We ought to tell the agency that it exceeded its power.
I have tried to make clear that frequently a statute's plain meaning
is not going to be easily discerned, and it is not going to be discerned at
all if the judges and courts do not look at the legislative history. Unfor-
tunately, this does not end discussion about legislative history because
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frequently the process of "making legislative history" is abused. In fact,
that very term used to offend me when I was in Congress. Nothing made
me squirm more than when some lawyer, who ought to have known bet-
ter, would get up for the purpose of "making legislative history," saying,
"watch me, I'm making history"-and then proceed to read a speech
that had been prepared for him before he got to the floor.
Even more offensive is the pas de deux that frequently occurs on the
floor. Two members will rise and engage in a colloquy for the purpose of
"making legislative history." Frequently, however, the colloquy is writ-
ten by just one of the members, not both. It is handed to the other actor
and the two of them read it like a grade B radio script. And that is the
material that judges later will solemnly pore over, under the guise of
"studying the legislative history." This, of course, is ridiculous. The
problem is that judges don't know as much as they ought to know about
the legislative process. Judges, who are educable, ought to be able to
learn about how the process works, just as congressmen ought to be able
to learn about how the judicial review process works. With more in-
terchange than now occurs, these two branches ought to be able to agree
on common rules of behavior so that when a judge talks about debate, he
is talking about real debate and not the phenomenon I have just de-
scribed. In turn, Congress ought to undertake more reform measures
like the "bullet" rule, which requires that any speech or remarks in the
Congressional Record by an absent member of Congress be preceeded by
an asterisk or "bullet." This was not a far-reaching, overwhelming re-
form, but it was a step in the right direction. Now a judge can tell when
a member was present on the floor and was saying something or when, in
fact, he was off in Miami basking in the sun while his staff put some
extracurricular remarks in the interoffice mailbox, which then appeared
at the appropriate place in the record.
Congress and the judges should also agree on some canons of inter-
pretation. There is room for some interpretive rules, if used by each
branch. (At times I am somewhat dismayed, though, to talk about the
problem of ejusdem generis when most of the Congress does not know
what I am saying and does not care about what I am saying, even as I am
saying it.) Perhaps a rule could be fashioned to govern when congres-
sional silence is to be deemed assent, rather than what is usually the case:
that most of the time Congress does not read judicial opinions and does
not know whether courts properly interpreted the statute.
Perhaps staff members of the relevant committees ought to be re-
quired to read judicial opinions interpreting statutes. Then, at least, they
would know what has happened to that beautiful work of art they sent
out into the world, and how the courts now function under it. There is
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an interrelationship between the two branches: the Congress makes the
laws and the courts interpret the laws. We ought to be more cognizant of
that interrelationship.
In the absence of these reforms, we still must deal with the problem
of resolving fine ambiguities in a statute, ambiguities where courts really
do not know what a Congress had in mind. My approach is to go to the
place in the legislative history where the majority did focus on the ambi-
guity. To this end, I always find that the committee report is the most
useful device; it is what I use to try to resolve some of those ambignities.
Most of the time-not always, and not for every committee-the com-
mittee report represents the synthesis of the last meaningful discussion
and debate on the issue. The committee report is usually drafted by the
majority staff, more often than not with substantial input from the mi-
nority on the committee. Indeed, because the committee report is so use-
ful, one of the reforms that I would advocate is that the chairman and
the staff stop using the committee reports to engage in horse trading and
logrolling.
I have argued here that the use of legislative history is compelled by
the inherent ambiguities of statutes, ambiguities behind which often lie a
discernable congressional intent. I have also tried to describe some re-
forms that would allow courts to use legislative history more reliably and
more efficiently. Now, I would like to respond to the notion that with
respect to the use of legislative history, one school of thought abnegates
political power, while the other school grabs it. This is just not so. A
scheme of judicial interpretation of statutes that eschews the use of legis-
lative history can easily come to rely upon the significance of the use, or
omission, of certain prepositions, or even the placement of commas and
semi-colons. Let me put the commas and semi-colons where I claim they
are meaningful, and let me interpret the "plain words" of a statute, and I
can exercise all kinds of power that I probably should not.
My own feeling is that judicial restraint starts with the proposition
that a judge is not supposed to be making policy decisions. People who
have been in the public arena make good judges because most of us have
had an opportunity to test our policy ideas; either they did not get
adopted or, when they did get adopted, they turned out not to be so great
after all. I am perfectly delighted to let other people make policy deci-
sions at this point. I tried making them for over twenty years and the
republic isn't much more secure for my twenty years of effort than it was
before I started.
As judges we are not supposed to do what the legislative branch
does-we are not supposed to try to do it better; we are not supposed to
finish the task; and we are not supposed to get into areas that the legisla-
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ture did not get into. Democratic theory not only requires courts to give
appropriate deference to the first branch, but also to recognize that the
elected policymakers make the law, and therefore the law is what they
say it is. Congress is like Humpty Dumpty in Through the Looking
Glass. When Congress uses a word, the word means what Congress says
it means, all the dictionary definitions to the contrary notwithstanding.
If Congress has established what it wants a word to mean, that is what it
means.
The question, of course, is how to make this primacy meaningful.
One thing to bear in mind is that while judges should not take their role
of interpreting statutes lightly, the job is not quite so awesome as inter-
preting the Constitution of the United States. When an Article III judge
interprets the Constitution, only higher judges can correct a misinterpre-
tation. But when a judge misinterprets a statute that Congress has writ-
ten, Congress can correct the error. Sometimes the ink isn't dry on some
of our decisions when Congress has made it clear that it disagrees. There
is an opinion on page 98 of volume 342 of the United States Reports,
United States v. Wunderlich (1951), interpreting a federal statute, which
is almost word for word the way I drafted it for Justice Minton. It lasted
less than three months before Congress overruled it in its entirety. It
gives me some solace to know that even if I am wrong, Congress is there
to correct me.
If judges are to make congressional primacy meaningful, they can-
not afford to ignore those obvious tools which members of Congress use
to explain what they are doing and to describe the meaning of the words
used in the statute. Those who refuse to use the tools are merely saying
that they don't want to look. Their feeling is that you ought not to look
at the legislative process if you want to digest it because it is just too
messy and untidy. But the alternative is to give a judge the relatively
unrestrained power to look just at the statute's words and at Webster's
Dictionary, and to decide with Webster's what the law of the land will
be. I would rather the judge use all the tools that are available. Fortu-
nately, if he is wrong, Congress can correct him.
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